Scholars have focused on elite-level and mass-level changes to explain partisan polarization in Congress. This article offers a candidate entry explanation for the persistence of polarization and the rise in asymmetric polarization. The central claim is that ideological conformity with the party-what I call Party Fit-influences the decision to run for office, and I suggest that partisan polarization in Congress has discouraged ideological moderates in the pipeline from pursuing a congressional career. I test this hypothesis with a survey of state legislators and with ideology estimates of state legislators who did and did not run for Congress from 2000 to 2010. I find that liberal Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators are less likely to run for Congress than those at the ideological poles, though this disparity is especially pronounced among Republicans. The findings provide an additional explanation for recent patterns of polarization in Congress. This article contributes to the polarization literature by offering a candidate entry explanation that highlights ideological variation in the types of candidates who run for Congress.
Partisan polarization has been one of the most prominent topics in congressional scholarship over the past decade. The distance between the two parties in Congress has continued to grow with nearly each election cycle, and partisan polarization is now at record highs (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) . Those in the ideological middle have all but vanished from office, and Congress is currently characterized by what Bafumi and Herron (2010) call "leapfrog representation," with ideological extremists being replaced by other extremists. While it is clear that both parties have moved away from the center, scholars have also argued that polarization is "asymmetric" and that the Republican Party has shifted further to the right than the Democratic Party has to the left (e.g., Carmines 2011; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Mann and Ornstein 2012; McCarty et al. 2006; Skocpol and Williamson 2012) . Studies of member ideology show that replacement processes are the primary driver behind the rise in polarization (Fleisher and Bond 2004; Theriault 2006 ) and asymmetric polarization (Carmines 2011 ), but we know little about why these replacements are more extreme than their predecessors.
This article contributes to the polarization literature by offering a candidate entry explanation that highlights ideological variation in the types of candidates who run for Congress.
The central claim is that ideological conformity with the party's ideological reputation-what I call Party Fit-influences the decision to run for office. A party's ideological reputation conveys information about the type of candidate that belongs in the party, and potential candidates draw on this reputation to determine if they can achieve their electoral and policy goals and to decide whether to run for office. The Party Fit hypothesis suggests that in the contemporary political context, partisan polarization in Congress has discouraged ideological moderates in the political pipeline from pursuing a congressional career. I test this hypothesis with survey data of the perceptions of state legislators (Maestas et al. 2006; Stone et al. 2004 ) and with ideology estimates of state legislators who did and did not run for Congress from 2000 to 2010 (Bonica 2013b ). I find that liberal Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators are less likely to run for Congress than those at the ideological poles, though this disparity is particularly pronounced on the Republican side. These findings provide an additional explanation for recent patterns of polarization in Congress, and they have important implications for the persistence of polarization over the long run. If the only individuals willing to run for Congress emerge from the ideological extremes, it is doubtful that partisan polarization will fade anytime soon.
The Decline of Moderates in the U.S. Congress
Scholars have focused on two types of explanations for the rise in partisan polarization in Congress. One set of explanations highlights various ideological shifts in the electorate. First, Southern constituencies became less homogeneously conservative following the passage of the Voting Rights Act, which enfranchised many African American voters who supported the Democratic Party (Aldrich 2011; Rohde 1991) . Both parties gradually lost their moderate factions, with conservative whites in the South abandoning the Democrats and liberals in the Northeast leaving the Republicans. In addition, the electoral bases of the two parties shifted from being diverse to more uniform (Fleisher and Bond 2004; Stonecash et al. 2003) . Despite the dispute over mass polarization (Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina et al. 2006) , most agree that voters are better sorted along party lines and that they increasingly match their partisanship with their ideological preferences (Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2009 ). Lastly, party activists have become increasingly extreme (Fiorina et al. 2006; Layman and Carsey 2002; Layman et al. 2010; Theriault 2008) . Because activists participate in primaries, contribute money to candidates, and spend their time working on campaigns, they have a greater impact on the electoral process than ordinary voters.
The other set of explanations for polarization instead highlights changes that have occurred within Congress. Increased levels of party homogeneity have supplied the leadership with tools to foster party discipline and advance the party's agenda (Aldrich 2011; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Rohde 1991) . Newly empowered party leaders have assumed greater responsibility in allocating committee assignments, setting the legislative agenda, and structuring debate on the floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Sinclair 2006 ). Majority party leaders draw extensively on legislative procedure to exert their will, and the resulting polarization on procedural issues has exacerbated the disparity between the two parties (Sinclair 2006; Theriault 2008) . Moreover, party leaders are more extreme than the median member of the party caucus (Grofman et al. 2002; Heberlig et al. 2006; Jessee and Malhotra 2011) , and they may move the party's agenda closer to their own preferences (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Roberts and Smith 2003) .
As noted above, although both parties have shifted away from the center, a number of scholars have argued that there are key distinctions between the two parties (e.g., Carmines 2011; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Mann and Ornstein 2012; McCarty et al. 2006; Skocpol and Williamson 2012) . They suggest that the Republican Party has moved further to the right than the Democrat Party has to the left (but see Bonica 2013b). Also, and particularly significant here, the Democratic delegation has remained relatively more ideologically dispersed (Bonica 2013a ). Bonica's (2013b) (Mann and Ornstein 2012) .
Like the general polarization literature, explanations for asymmetric polarization have focused on changes in party activists and the heightened use of restrictive procedures in
Congress. Yet we are still searching for reasons as to why Congress is becoming more and more polarized with almost each election cycle. There is little empirical evidence to support the claim that gerrymandering and primary election systems have had a substantial effect on congressional polarization (Hirano et al. 2010; McCarty et al. 2009; McGhee et al. 2013 ; see also Sides and Vavreck 2013) . And Fiorina et al. (2006) further illustrate how extremist voters, or at least sorted ones, can elect moderate candidates if these candidates are positioned at the ideological center. More generally, we know that member replacement is responsible for much of the rise in partisan polarization (Fleisher and Bond 2004; Theriault 2006 ) and asymmetric polarization (Carmines 2011) , and scholars must begin to explore how candidate self-selection processes also contribute to these trends.
A Party Fit Explanation for Polarization in Congress
This article extends our understanding of contemporary patterns of partisan polarization in Congress by introducing the concept of Party Fit. Party Fit is the congruence between a candidate's ideology and the ideological reputation of the party delegation to which she would belong upon election. The party's ideological reputation is about "what the party stands for-and acts on-in terms of policy" (Aldrich and Freeze 2011, 186) , and it gives meaning to its label and distinguishes the party from its opponent (Grynaviski 2010; Snyder and Ting 2002; Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012) . While a party's ideological reputation matters in clear ways for the kinds of policies it pursues, scholars have paid less attention to how this reputation matters for the inclusion and exclusion of political candidates in the electoral process.
The central hypothesis is that ideological conformity with the party's reputation-what I call Party Fit-influences the decision to run for office. There are two mechanisms by which Party Fit affects the types of candidates who seek elective office: self-selection and party recruitment (Aldrich 2011 ). Candidates will self-select into electoral contests if they believe they are a good fit for the party, and those who do not will instead abstain. Similarly, party leaders will recruit candidates they deem electorally viable and gate-keep those they do not (Sanbonmatsu 2006) . It is difficult to distinguish between these two mechanisms, and indeed, they are almost certainly mutually reinforcing. Due to the continued prominence of the candidate-centered model in American politics (Jacobson 2004; McGhee and Pearson 2011) , this article focuses on the self-selection mechanism. However, the argument does not preclude a role for parties, and it is likely that party recruitment also shapes perceptions of Party Fit. In addition, the theoretical expectations apply to both incumbent and non-incumbent candidates, but because replacement processes have been central to the rise in polarization, I focus on the latter, and more specifically, on non-incumbents who are well situated to run for Congress.
There are many reasons to expect that potential candidates rely on the party's reputation to determine if they can achieve their electoral and policy goals (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974). 3 First, potential candidates draw on this reputation to estimate their likelihood of winning. Sniderman and Stiglitz (2012) show that candidates receive a reputational premium if they take a position that is consistent with the policy outlook of their party, and those who are positioned to run for office use the party's reputation to evaluate their own chance of winning. Second, potential candidates rely on the party's reputation to assess their future policy impact and their prospective influence in the legislative chamber (Fenno 1973) . Members of Congress experience intense pressure to support the party's legislative agenda, and those who defect can expect to be punished for their actions and denied party rewards (Sinclair 2006; Theriault 2008) .
The ability to achieve these electoral and policy goals has long been shown to matter in studies of political ambition (Black 1972; Rohde 1979; Schlesinger 1966) , and Maestas et al. (2006) find that state legislators' perceived chance of winning and their reported value of a
House seat are two of the most important predictors of their attraction to a congressional career.
It is therefore crucial that we have a better understanding of what shapes these predictor variables. The Party Fit hypothesis suggests that ideological conformity with the party's reputation influences potential candidates' ability to achieve their electoral and policy goals, and those with preferences that conform to the party's reputation are more likely to run for political office than those with preferences that differ from this reputation.
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Because the party's ideological reputation changes over time and across historical contexts, the type of candidate that is a good fit for the party undergoes similar transformations.
As I discuss below, I treat initial shifts in the party's reputation as exogenous. Over the past fifty years, the two parties have become increasingly homogeneous as well as more polarized, and partisan polarization in the U.S. House has now reached a record high (e.g., McCarty et al. 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 2007) . There has been a hollowing out of the political center, and those in the middle have either been defeated or chosen to leave. Ideological moderates in the congressional pipeline may assume that their candidacies are doomed from the start (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007) and that they would be unlikely to achieve their non-electoral goals if elected to office. Party leaders who set the legislative agenda are now ideologues themselves (Heberlig et al. 2006; Jessee and Malhotra 2011) , and it would be difficult for moderates to either advance their desired policies or obtain a leadership position in Congress.
Thus, the Party Fit hypothesis suggests that in the contemporary context, ideological moderates in the congressional pipeline-liberal Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators-are less likely to run for Congress than those at the ideological poles. Specifically, the more liberal the Republican state legislator, the less likely she is to run for Congress; the more conservative the Democratic state legislator, the less likely she is to do so. The size of the effect may differ by party due to variation in the ideological heterogeneity of the two parties.
The Democratic Party delegation has remained relatively more ideologically dispersed than the Republican delegation (Bonica 2013a) . As a result, there will be fellow members for moderate Democrats to work with on policy issues, and the party may not seem as distant to moderate Democrats in the congressional pipeline.
It is similarly possible that potential candidates who are too extreme for the party may be dissuaded from running for Congress, but there are a variety of reasons to expect the congressional environment to be more attractive to ideologues than it is to moderates. For instance, ideologues are less likely to be cross-pressured than those in the middle, as their preferences are much closer to their party's position than that of the opposing party. Ideologues are also more likely to obtain a leadership position than members at the ideological center (Heberlig et al. 2006; Jessee and Malhotra 2011) . Ideological extremity is therefore not expected to have a negative effect on the probability of running for Congress, although this pattern may emerge among state legislators who are extreme ideological outliers, such as those who are more extreme than the most conservative Republican and the most liberal Democratic members of Congress. Nevertheless, the main focus here is on ideological variation in the decision to run among potential congressional candidates who comprise the bulk of the candidate pool.
A final note is that it is important to be clear about what the Party Fit framework can and cannot explain. Because party reputations are taken as exogenous, it fails to account for why the parties polarized initially. Scholars have already highlighted the importance of ideological shifts in both the electorate and within Congress for the emergence of polarization. These changes moved the parties apart and clarified the party reputations for voters and potential candidates alike. The Party Fit argument does, however, provide an additional mechanism through which polarization in Congress has been reinforced and even exacerbated. Notably, these patterns can persist irrespective of ideological changes in the electorate.
Data and Method
State legislative office is a well-known springboard to Congress (Jacobson and Kernell 1983) , and 51% of those who served in Congress between 1999 and 2008 had prior state legislative experience (Carnes 2012 Again, the Party Fit hypothesis suggests that ideological moderates in the pipeline-liberal
Republican and conservative Democratic state legislators-are less likely to believe they can win the primary and less likely to value a seat in the U.S. House than those at the poles. The magnitude of the effect may differ by party due to variation in the ideological heterogeneity of the Republican and Democratic parties.
I use an OLS model to examine how Party Fit shapes state legislators' perceived chance of winning the primary and their value of a seat in the U.S. House. The dependent variables capture whether they believe they can achieve their electoral and non-electoral goals. 7 The first dependent variable is a direct measure of state legislators' perceived chance of winning the primary. 8 State legislators rated their chance of winning the party nomination if they ran for Congress in the foreseeable future. Following Maestas et al. (2006) , the response is scaled as a "pseudo-probability" that ranges from 0.01 to 0.99 (extremely unlikely to extremely likely). The second dependent variable concerns the non-electoral goals that Fenno (1973) highlighted, measured as state legislators' value of a seat in the U.S. House. As in Maestas et al. (2006) , the 6 The data are drawn from the 1998 wave of the Candidate Emergence Study. The specific states are not identified in the publicly available data. The survey was mailed to 2,714 state legislators, and 874 of them responded, for a response rate of 32.2% (see Maestas et al. 2006, 199 face strong incumbents are expected to be more and less likely, respectively, to believe they can achieve their goals. Not all of the controls are expected to have the same effect on both of the dependent variables, however. State legislators who perceive the district partisanship to be favorable may rate the value of the seat to be higher but assess their chance of winning to be 9 I also ran the models with respondents' positions on four policy issues that are included in both of the party platforms. Respondents are coded as non-conformists if they are indifferent or oppose the position in their party's platform on an issue and conformists if they favor their party's position (1 and 0, respectively). These values were summed across the policies; lower (higher) values indicate more (less) conformity with the party. The results are provided in Supplementary Appendix B.
lower due to increased primary competition. Conversely, those who have served more terms in state legislative office and those in professionalized state legislatures may report a higher chance of winning but a lower seat value given the costs of leaving the state legislature.
Results
The results with the CES data are presented in Table 1 below. This section focuses on the main variable of interest, state legislator ideology, and then briefly reports the results on the control variables. The Republican model is discussed first and the Democratic model second. reported value of a seat in the U.S. House. However, the lack of significance among Democrats
General" is the dependent variable. Also, the results are similar when policy preferences are used instead of ideology. Republican state legislators with preferences that do not conform to the party's platform are less likely to believe they can achieve their electoral and non-electoral goals than those with preferences that do (see Supplementary Appendix B).
11 Predictor variables were standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
12 I am not able to test whether respondents self-select out of running or are gate-kept out by party leaders, but I expect both mechanisms to be at work. Among very conservative and conservative Republicans, 4.4% reported being contacted by the party, versus 1.8% of those with more liberal preferences, which conforms to the argument here. In terms of the model, this would lead me to underestimate the effect of ideology as candidate ideology might have an influence on party recruitment but not vice versa, as the ideology of most legislators does not change significantly over time (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) .
makes sense given the timing of the survey. This wave of the CES survey was conducted in 1998, and there were important ideological differences between the parties at that point. In the 105 th Congress (1997-98) The results on the control variables are similar to those in the Republican models. 13 State legislators who were contacted by the political party and those in more professionalized state legislatures believe they are more likely to win the primary. Also, Democratic state legislators rate their chance of victory to be lower when the incumbent is strong, and respondents who are older as well as those who deem the partisan balance of their districts to be favorable say they are less likely to win the primary. Those who are older also assess the value of a seat in the House to be lower (p<0.10), and contrary to expectations, the relationship between state legislators' ability to raise money and their reported value of a House seat is negative.
In sum, traditional factors such as party recruitment, past political experience, and the ability to garner support from voters, donors, and outside groups matter in clear ways for whether state legislators believe they can achieve their electoral and policy goals. However, scholars have overlooked how state legislators' ideological congruence-or lack thereof-with their party's ideological reputation may also influence candidate emergence. The findings suggest that liberal Republicans in the pipeline are less likely to believe they can achieve their electoral and policy goals than conservatives in the pipeline. Conservative and liberal Democrats in the pipeline are statistically indistinguishable in terms of their perceived chance of winning the primary and their reported value of a House seat, but this makes sense given the ideological makeup of the Democratic Party at the time of the survey.
The Implications of Party Fit for Candidate Emergence
The The model includes controls for a variety of electoral, institutional, and partisan factors.
To account for district-level factors, I control for whether there was an incumbent running for reelection in the state legislator's congressional district, as well as the ideology of the state legislator's congressional district (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013) . 19 I used Bonica's (2013b) data to calculate the average amount of money individuals raised as state legislators, as this and the results are identical. In addition, I ran the model with state fixed effects, and the results remain the same. State fixed effects are not included here because doing so leads to a sizeable decrease in the number of observations, but year fixed effects are included. 17 The state legislator ideology data are shown descriptively in Supplementary Appendix D. I also measured Party Fit as the difference between the state legislator's ideology and the congressional party median (i.e., the absolute distance between her CFscore and the CFscore of the party median) and as the state legislator's relative closeness to her party in Congress (i.e., the absolute value of a state legislator's distance from her party median subtracted from the absolute value of her distance from the opposing party median) (see Supplementary Appendix E). I use state legislator ideology here, as the main goal is to highlight how candidate self-selection matters for patterns of partisan polarization in Congress.
18 While the theory also posits a role for the ideological heterogeneity of the party, the standard deviation of the CFscores of either party do not vary sufficiently during the time frame here to include them in the model. The results are presented in Table 2 below. Of most importance is the negative coefficient on the Party Fit variable. 20 As expected, Republican liberalism and Democratic conservatism has a negative effect on candidate emergence: the more liberal the Republican state legislator, the less likely she is to run for Congress; the more conservative the Democratic state legislator, the less likely she is to do so.
21 20 The models with the alternative specifications of Party Fit tell the same story: state legislators who are further from the congressional party median are less likely to run for Congress, and state legislators who are relatively closer to their own party median are more likely to do so (see Supplementary Appendix E). 21 In the graphs shown here, the probability of running for Congress is highest among state legislators at the extremes, though this probability eventually decreases among very extreme ideologues. These graphs are provided in Supplementary Appendix F. The focus of this article is on the bulk of the observations in the dataset, but the fact that being too extreme is also a liability lends support to the Party Fit hypothesis. Figure 1 presents the predicted probability of running for Congress for Republican state legislators across a range of ideology scores. 22 The graph also shows the predicted probabilities for state legislators who have the same ideology scores as various former and current members of Congress, including moderates like Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Steven LaTourette (R-OH) and conservatives like Paul Ryan (R-WI) and Speaker John Boehner (R-OH). The probability 22 All other variables are set at their mean or mode.
that any state legislator runs for Congress is low, but the difference across Republicans is striking. For state legislators who resemble conservatives like Paul Ryan and John Boehner, the probability of running for Congress is 1.9% and 1.1%, respectively, but this decreases to 0.3% and 0.2% for state legislators who resemble ideological moderates like Steven LaTourette and Olympia Snowe, respectively. In other words, the probability that a conservative state legislator like Paul Ryan runs for Congress is more than nine times greater than that of a moderate state legislator like Olympia Snowe. Note: The arrows refer to hypothetical state legislators that have the same ideological scores as various former and current members of Congress. For example, the arrow corresponding to Paul Ryan represents the probability of running for Congress for a state legislator who has the same ideology score as Ryan.
For Democratic state legislators, the situation looks slightly different. Conservative
Democrats are also less likely to run for Congress than those with more liberal preferences, but there are important differences between Republicans and Democrats in terms of the size of the effect. Figure 2 illustrates the predicted probability of running for Congress for Democratic state legislators across a range of ideology scores. We can also use the scores of former and current These patterns conform to Carmines' (2011) finding that the ideological distribution of newly elected Democrats is wider than that of newly elected Republicans. Note: The arrows refer to hypothetical state legislators that have the same ideological scores as various former and current members of Congress. For example, the arrow corresponding to Nancy Pelosi represents the probability of running for Congress for a state legislator who has the same ideology score as Pelosi.
In terms of the control variables, the probability of seeking congressional office is lower are less likely to run for Congress than their male counterparts. Lastly, the coefficient on the extreme ideologue dummy variable is insignificant in both models, which may in part be due to the relative dearth of very extreme ideologues in the dataset.
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Taken together, the results provide evidence in support of the Party Fit hypothesis, which suggests that ideological moderates in the congressional pipeline are less likely to run for
Congress than those at the ideological poles. Specifically, the more liberal the Republican state legislator, the less likely she is to run for Congress; the more conservative the Democratic state legislator, the less likely she is to do so. This disparity between ideologues and moderates is particularly pronounced on the Republican side, which provides an additional explanation for why Republican replacements have been increasingly conservative (Bonica 2010; Carmines 2011) . While scholars have yet to explore the effect of candidate ideology and Party Fit on the 23 The results are identical if the extreme ideologue dummy variable is excluded from the models.
decision to run for congressional office, the results presented here show that patterns of candidate entry have important implications for the persistence of polarization in Congress. replacement processes are the main driver behind the rise in polarization (Theriault 2006) , and the abstention of ideological moderates from the candidate pool-and the selection of ideologues into the candidate pool-suggests that partisan polarization is here to stay.
Conclusion
Nearly fifty ago Schlesinger (1966, 1) claimed, "Ambition lies at the heart of politics."
The quality of political representation is compromised when only a narrow ideological subset of individuals is willing to engage in electoral contests. Scholars of legislative representation and partisan polarization must turn their attention to questions of candidate emergence to understand why some individuals seek elective office and others do not. 
